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Go shop clause

A go-shop clause is a provision in a definitive merger agreement that permits a target company to actively solicit and consider alternative acquisition proposals from third parties for a specified period after signing a deal with an initial bidder. This period, typically ranging from 30 to 60 days, is designed to ensure that the target's board of directors fulfills its fiduciary duty to shareholders by seeking the best possible price. The go-shop clause is a key element within the broader field of Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A), aiming to maximize shareholder value.

What Is a Go-Shop Clause?

A go-shop clause is a contractual provision found in a merger agreement that allows the target company to "shop around" for a superior offer even after it has entered into a binding agreement with a primary buyer. In essence, it provides a window during which the target can actively solicit competing bids. This contrasts with more restrictive exclusivity clauses like "no-shop" provisions. The initial offer often serves as a "stalking horse bid," setting a floor for any potential higher offers. This mechanism is primarily utilized in takeovers, schemes of arrangement, or private M&A transactions.28

History and Origin

Prior to the mid-2000s, the traditional process for selling U.S. public companies typically involved a broad market canvass before signing a merger agreement, followed by a "no-shop" obligation for the seller until the closing. However, the introduction of the go-shop clause significantly altered this standard practice.26, 27

The first notable transaction featuring a go-shop provision emerged in March 2004, with Welsh, Carson, Anderson & Stowe's buyout of US Oncology.24, 25 Following this, go-shop clauses rapidly gained popularity, especially in private equity buyouts of public companies.23 This development was partly a response to the ongoing tension between securing a definitive deal quickly and the target board's obligation to obtain the highest possible value for its shareholders, often referred to as "Revlon duties" in Delaware case law.22 Initially, many commentators were skeptical, viewing go-shops merely as a facade to justify a preferred bidder while insulating the board from claims of failing to maximize value.21 Despite this skepticism, early empirical studies suggested that go-shops could facilitate meaningful "market checks," with higher bids emerging in a notable percentage of cases.20

Key Takeaways

  • A go-shop clause allows a target company to solicit alternative acquisition proposals after signing an initial merger agreement.
  • It typically includes a specified period, often 30 to 60 days, during which active solicitation is permitted.
  • The primary purpose of a go-shop clause is to help the target's board fulfill its fiduciary duty to maximize shareholder value.
  • If a superior offer is accepted, the initial bidder usually receives a breakup fee.
  • Go-shop provisions are most common in leveraged buyouts (LBOs) and "go-private" transactions.

Interpreting the Go-Shop Clause

A go-shop clause should be interpreted as a strategic tool within a takeover process, reflecting the target board's intent to conduct a thorough market check even after a preliminary agreement. The existence of a go-shop provision signals that the board aims to publicly solicit additional offers, aiming to secure the highest possible value. The duration of the go-shop period, and the size of any associated termination fees, are crucial indicators of how genuinely open the process is to competing offers. Longer periods and tiered, rather than flat, termination fees can suggest a more robust market-testing effort. The inclusion of a go-shop clause can also be seen as an effort by the target's board of directors to mitigate legal risks related to fiduciary responsibility in change-of-control transactions.

Hypothetical Example

Imagine "Tech Innovations Inc." is being acquired by "Global Holdings Corp." Global Holdings offers to purchase all outstanding shares of Tech Innovations for $50 per share. As part of their acquisition agreement, a go-shop clause is included, granting Tech Innovations a 45-day period to solicit alternative bids.

During this 45-day window, Tech Innovations' financial advisors actively reach out to other potential buyers. On day 30, "Innovate Ventures," a competitor, submits a new acquisition proposal to buy Tech Innovations for $55 per share. Because this offer is made within the go-shop period, Tech Innovations' board can formally engage with Innovate Ventures. Global Holdings typically has a "matching right," allowing them to increase their bid to match or exceed Innovate Ventures' offer. If Global Holdings declines to match, and Tech Innovations accepts Innovate Ventures' higher offer, Tech Innovations would typically pay Global Holdings a pre-negotiated breakup fee as compensation for their initial efforts and the time spent. This scenario illustrates how the go-shop clause facilitates a competitive bidding process, potentially leading to a higher enterprise value for the target.

Practical Applications

Go-shop provisions are primarily found in merger agreements and takeover bids within the realm of corporate finance. They serve as a contractual mechanism to ensure a proper "market check" for the target company. Companies, particularly those going private in a leveraged buyout, often favor go-shop clauses when they have not conducted an extensive pre-signing auction or are concerned about fully satisfying their fiduciary duties.19 For instance, a target company might prefer a go-shop rather than a pre-signing auction to avoid potential negative impacts on employee morale, customer retention, or the risk of leaks of confidential information to competitors if an auction were to receive no or low bids.18

While seemingly favoring the target, buyers sometimes agree to go-shop clauses as well. This can help avoid the delays associated with a pre-signing auction and provides the buyer with some assurance that courts will not find the target's board breached its fiduciary duties.17 A notable example from recent M&A deals included a go-shop provision in Mainstream Group Holdings' scheme implementation deed, which successfully led to a superior proposal from a rival bidder at a significant premium.16

Limitations and Criticisms

Despite their intended purpose of maximizing shareholder value, go-shop clauses have faced limitations and criticisms regarding their actual effectiveness. Recent empirical studies suggest that go-shops, particularly in the period from 2010 to 2019, have become less effective as a tool for "price discovery" post-signing.14, 15 Several factors contribute to this decline:

  • Proliferation of Match Rights: Initial bidders almost always retain the right to match any superior proposal. This can deter third-party bidders, as they know their offer might simply be used to force the initial bidder to increase their price, without necessarily securing the deal for themselves.13
  • Shortening of Go-Shop Windows: Go-shop periods have generally become shorter, especially in larger deals.12 A limited timeframe, typically one to two months, often does not provide potential bidders with sufficient time to conduct comprehensive due diligence and formulate a competitive offer, particularly for complex transactions.11
  • Information Asymmetries: Shorter windows amplify information asymmetries, making it harder for new bidders to assess the target accurately.10
  • CEO Conflicts of Interest: Potential conflicts of interest for target management can also hinder the effectiveness of the go-shop process.9

Critics argue that while go-shops can theoretically facilitate allocational efficiency, their practical application has sometimes fallen short due to the evolution of deal terms and practices.7, 8 For example, a "closed" go-shop, which requires a competing bidder to execute a definitive agreement within the go-shop period, may receive higher scrutiny from courts, especially if the period is less than 30 days.6

Go-Shop Clause vs. No-Shop Clause

The primary distinction between a go-shop clause and a no-shop clause lies in the permissibility of active solicitation for alternative bids. A go-shop clause explicitly allows and often requires the target company to seek out and engage with other potential buyers for a defined period after signing an initial merger agreement. Its intent is to actively test the market to ensure the best possible offer price is achieved.

Conversely, a no-shop clause, which is far more common in M&A deals, generally restricts the target company from actively soliciting or encouraging alternative acquisition proposals once a definitive agreement has been signed. Under a no-shop, the target typically cannot offer confidential information to potential buyers or initiate discussions with them. However, almost all no-shop provisions include an exception, often called a "fiduciary out," which permits the target's board to engage with unsolicited "superior proposals" if declining to do so would breach their fiduciary duties to shareholders.5 Therefore, while a go-shop empowers active searching, a no-shop primarily allows for reactive engagement with unsolicited, genuinely superior offers.

FAQs

What is the purpose of a go-shop clause?

The main purpose of a go-shop clause is to allow a target company's board of directors to actively seek higher or better acquisition offers after agreeing to an initial bid. This helps them fulfill their fiduciary obligation to shareholders by ensuring they receive the maximum value for their shares.

How long does a typical go-shop period last?

A typical go-shop period usually lasts between 30 and 60 days.4 This timeframe is intended to provide sufficient opportunity for potential alternative bidders to emerge and submit proposals.

What happens if a better offer is found during the go-shop period?

If a superior offer is received during the go-shop period, the target company can engage with the new bidder. The initial bidder typically has a "matching right," allowing them to revise their offer to match or exceed the new proposal. If the initial bidder does not match the superior offer and the target accepts the new bid, the target generally pays a pre-negotiated termination fee to the initial bidder.3

Are go-shop clauses always effective?

No, while designed to be effective, their impact can vary. Studies indicate that their effectiveness in generating higher bids has declined over time due to factors such as shorter go-shop windows, match rights given to initial bidders, and potential conflicts of interest.2

Why would a buyer agree to a go-shop clause?

A buyer might agree to a go-shop clause to avoid the lengthy and potentially disruptive process of a pre-signing auction. It also provides some legal comfort that the target's board has fulfilled its fiduciary duties, reducing the risk of shareholder lawsuits. Additionally, the initial bidder often has an advantage, knowing they have a signed agreement and frequently possessing matching rights.1